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THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT-
A RETURN TO FUNDAMENTALS
Some commentators have expressed concern' that the Supreme Court
has permanently strayed from the historical test2 for interpreting the
seventh amendment. 3 Two recent landlord-tenant decisions evidence
the Court's return to this test for determining when a party may claim
the constitutional right to a civil jury trial.
In Curtis v. Loether4 plaintiff brought an action under Title VIII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (Fair Housing Act),5 claiming that
defendants had refused to rent her an apartment because of her race. 6
In Pernell v. Southall Realty plaintiff landlord asserted that defend-
ant's rent was three months in arrears and sought restitution of pos-
session under a District of Columbia statute.8 In each case the trial
I. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 8.10, at 374 (1965); J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE RULES PAMPHLET 805-10 (1970). See also Note, Ross v. Bernhard:
The Uncertain Future of the Seventh Amendment, 81 YALE L.J. 112 (1971).
2. Under the traditional test, the seventh amendment is interpreted to preserve
the right to civil jury trial as it existed under the common law in 1791, when
the Bill of Rights was finally ratified. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476
(1935). The test entails a study of the division of jurisdiction among then
existing courts of law, equity and admiralty; in 1791 the right to jury trial was
limited to actions at law, although it did not apply to all such actions. McCoid,
Procedural Reform and the Right to Jury Trial: A Study of Beacon Theatres,
Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1967).
3. "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by
a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
4. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1970), prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental
of housing. Section 812 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612
(1970), authorizes private plaintiffs to bring civil actions to redress violations
of the Act's fair housing provisions.
6. 415 U.S. at 190. Plaintiff, a black woman, sought injunctive relief and
punitive and compensatory damages against the white defendants. An injunction
was granted and then dissolved with plaintiff's consent, leaving the issues of
actual and punitive damages for trial.
7. 416 U.S. 363 (1974).
8. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1501 (1973), provides in pertinent part: "When a
person detains possession of real property without right, or after his right to
possession has ceased, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia . . . may
issue a summons to the party complained of to appear and show cause why judg-
ment should not be given against him for the restitution of possession."
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court denied defendants' request for a jury trial.9 The Supreme Court,
in opinions by Mr. Justice Marshall, held that each action involved
rights and remedies of the sort traditionally heard by a jury at common
law, entitling the parties to a jury trial on demand.
The seventh amendment provides a right to jury trial "in suits at
common law."'1 Early in the nineteenth century this phrase was con-
strued to dictate an historical test," with courts to be guided by
English common law practice of 1791.12 This test was followed by
most federal courts until 1959. In that year the Supreme Court seem-
ingly abandoned the historical test in favor of a functional analysis
in response to procedural reforms resulting from the merger of law
and equity. 3 Functional analysis applies only when a particular case
would not have gone to a jury at common law. Instead of looking
only to what a court would have done in 1791, as under the tradi-
9. Rogers v. Loether, 312 F. Supp. 1008 (E.D. Wis. 1970), rev'd, 467 F.2d
"1110 (7th Cir. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
For a discussion of the court of appeals decision see Comment, The Seventh
Amendment and Civil Rights Statutes: History Adrift in a Maelstrom, 68 Nw.
U.L. Rav. 503, 504-06 (1973). Pernell v. Southall Realty (Super. Ct. D.C., Aug.
9, 1971), aff'd, 294 A.2d 490 (D.C. App. 1972), rev'd, 416 U.S. 363 (1974). For
a discussion of the appellate court decision see 1 FORDHrAM URBAN L.. 492
(1973).
10. See note 3 supra.
11. United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745 (No. 16,750) (C.C.D. Mass.
1812).
12. Id. Mr. Justice Story (on circuit) stated that the phrase "common law"
referred to that of England rather than that of the individual states, as each
state had its own practices. Id. at 750. A single definition was needed to produce
a uniform jury trial right throughout the federal judiciary. Comment, The
Seventh Amendment and Civil Rights Statutes, supra note 9, at 506.
13. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). See also
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
In 1791 not every civil action was tried to a jury; issues in actions at law
were generally so tried, while issues at equity were only so tried if the chancellor
chose to send an issue to a jury for an advisory verdict. With the merger of
law and equity in 1938, a single civil action was substituted for separate suits
in law and equity. FED. R. Cry. P. 2. Provision was made for trial of both legal
and equitable issues in the same action and differentiation of issues into jury and
nonjury. See 5 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTCE § 38.03, at 24.1-.2 (2d ed. 1974).
Prior to 1938, cases such as Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen would have
been tried at equity because of the inadequacy of relief at law, but the Federal
Rules obviated the difficulties with legal relief. While a purely historical test
would have dictated a contrary result, the only reason why the cases would not
have been heard by a jury at common law was no longer applicable, and the
Court granted jury trial. This result was consistent with the Court's long-standing
policy of avoiding unnecessary restrictions on jury trials. See Simler v. Conner,
372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963).
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tional test, functional analysis focuses upon the reasons why that case
would not have been tried by a jury. If procedural obstacles to legal
relief have been corrected by merger and the Federal Rules, functional
analysis dictates that a jury trial be granted. 14 This kind of analysis
is not as radical as it may appear: the inquiry is still jurisdictional,
but the determination of jurisdiction is made by reference to existing
rather than past procedure. 15 Use of this analysis broadened the
scope of the right to jury trial beyond that available at common law.
Six years later the Court took its furthest step away from the historical
test by adopting a three-pronged analysis.16 History was only one
element to be considered.'7
Now, however, the Court has reverted to a fundamental historical
analysis for determining the scope of the seventh amendment. The
reasoning in both Curtis and Pernell was based on Mr. Justice Story's
famous dictum in a decision written over a century before the merger
of law and equity:
The phrase "common law," found in this clause [of the seventh
amendment], is used in contradistinction to equity, and admi-
ralty, and maritime jurisprudence .... By common law, [the
framers of the amendment] meant . . . not merely suits, which
the common law recognized among its old and settled proceed-
ings, but suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and
determined, in contradistinction to those, where equitable rights
alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were administered
.... In a just sense, the amendment then may well be construed
to embrace all suits, which are not of equity and admiralty juris-
diction, whatever may be the peculiar form which they may
assume to settle legal rights.Y'
14. The facts of Dairy Queen illustrate the use of functional analysis. There,
remedy at law was inadequate in 1791 because of the difficulty of determining
some of the factual questions, and an equitable accounting would have been
required. Now, however, FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b) provides for reference to a
master in jury actions when the issues are especially complicated, eliminating
the need for an equitable accounting.
15. McCoid, supra note 2, at 24.
16. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
17. "As our cases indicate, the legal' nature of an issue is determined by
considering, first, the pre-merger custom with reference to such questions; second,
the remedy sought; and third, the practical abilities and limitations of juries. Of
these factors, the first, requiring extensive and possibly abstruse historical inquiry,
is obviously the most difficult to apply." Id. at 538 n.10. In subsequent decisions
the Court has not referred to the Ross test, perhaps indicating its narrow appli-
cability.
18. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830), as quoted in
Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 374-75 (1974), and Curtis v. Loether,
415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974).
1975]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
In Curtis'9 the Court found the Title VIII cause of action to be
analogous to tort actions recognized at common law, and the relief
sought-actual and punitive damages-to be the traditional form of
19. Prior to Curtis, lower courts were split on the applicability of the seventh
amendment to suits brought under Title VIII. E.g., Marr v. Rife, 363 F. Supp.
1362 (S.D. Ohio 1973) (no jury trial; an action based upon racial discrimination
could not have been maintained at common law); Kelly v. Armbrust, 351 F.
Supp. 869 (D.N.D. 1972) (jury trial; the action is one traditionally legal in
character and plaintiffs requested actual and punitive damages); Cauley v. Smith,
347 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Va. 1972) (no jury trial; the limitation on punitive
damages and the discretionary language of the statute indicate relief is equitable) ;
Kastner v. Brackett, 326 F. Supp. 1151 (D. Nev. 1971) (jury trial; the action
is one traditionally legal in character, similar either to a suit for breach of an
oral contract or a common law deceit action).
Curtis must have come as a surprise to commentators who had confidently
predicted a contrary ruling. E.g., Note, Jones v. Mayer: The Thirteenth Amend-
ment and the Federal Anti-Discrimination Laws, 69 COLUm. L. Rav. 1019, 1053
(1969); Note, Congressional Provision for Nonjury Trial under the Seventh
Amendment, 83 YAL. L.J. 401, 403 (1973). Such predictions, were based in
part on congressional intent that actions under Title VIII not be tried to a jury,
an important factor in Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966). Katchen held
that actions under the Bankruptcy Act were not to be tried to a jury because to
do so would interfere with the Act's goals of speed and inexpense of adjudication.
Commentators felt this reasoning could be applied to Title VIII actions by using
the third prong of the Ross analysis, see note 17 supra, to hold that trial by jury is
inadequate in such actions because of the cost, delay and possible prejudice of
juries. Note, Congressional Provision for Nonjury Trial under the Seventh Amend-
ment, supra.
A related basis for these predictions is the similarity of Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1970), and Title VII of the 1964
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. III, 1973), which prohibits dis-
crimination in employment. The right to jury trial has regularly been denied in
actions brought under Title VII. E.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791,
802 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969); Lowry v. Whitaker Cable
Corp., 348 F. Supp. 202, 209 n.3 (W.D. Mo. 1972). But cf. King v. Local 818,
Laborers, 443 F.2d 273, 275 (6th Cir. 1971). Some commentators believed, and
petitioners vigorously argued in Curtis, Brief for Petitioner at 9-14, Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), that Congress' use of the phrase "the court" in
both Titles VII and VIII indicated the actions were to be heard by the judge
alone. This interpretation of Title VII could have been used in Curtis. There
are, however, distinctions between the two statutes, such as Congress' 1972
amendment of Title VII to authorize "any other equitable relief." 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(g) (Supp. III, 1973), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970) (empha-
sis added). Because there was no right to jury trial at equity, see note 13 supra,
this amendment indicates that Congress intended Title VII actions to be tried
to the judge alone. As there were arguments both ways, the result in Curtis
can be justified on the basis of the Court's policy that all doubts are to be
resolved in favor of jury trials. See Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1891).
The Court has never directly considered the issue of jury trials in actions
brought under Title VII, and Mr. Justice Marshall was explicit in Curtis that
[Vol. 10:313
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relief at law.20 The analysis in Pernell involved a detailed study of
the forms of action for recovery of property at common law. The
Court concluded that the statutory action 2 1 encompassed rights and
remedies enforced by the action of ejectment at common law, which
included the right to jury trial.22 In neither case was reference made
to the three-pronged functional analysis test, upon which lower courts
have placed great emphasis2 5 and on which the litigants' briefs in
Pernell and Curtis heavily relied.2 4 The Court's strict adherence to
the traditional historical test in these cases suggests it never rejected
the test, but was forced to bend it to accommodate changes occasioned
by procedural reforms. This is not to say the Court will always use
the historical test, but rather that the test is preferred and will be
applied absent exigent circumstances.25
the Court would "express no view on the jury trial issue in that context." 415
U.S. at 197. He distinguished the two Acts on the basis of stautory language,
however. Although his statements may have been dicta, they do suggest that the
Court would uphold the denial of a jury trial under Title VII. Id. One may
wonder whether Congress intended for these two Acts, so alike in purpose, to
receive such different interpretations.
20. 415 U.S. at 195-96.
21. See note 8 supra.
22. 416 U.S. at 371-81.
23. E.g., Marr v. Rife, 363 F. Supp. 1362, 1363 (S.D. Ohio 1973); Richards
v. Smoltich, 359 F. Supp. 9, 11 (N.D. I1. 1973).
24. See Brief for Petitioner at 21, 31-35, Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S.
363 (1974); Brief for Respondent at 16-24, Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189
(1974).
25. Functional analysis may still be appropriate when the sole reason why a
suit would have been tried at equity in 1791 was the inadequacy of legal relief,
and that inadequacy has been eliminated by merger and the Federal Rules. The
analysis applied in Beacon Theatres, see note 13 supra, and its progeny may be
viewed as constitutionally compelled and constitutionally sound if the seventh
amendment embodies a principle of determination of jurisdiction by reference to
procedural adequacy, rather than solely by reference to past procedure. This per-
mits a redefinition of the right to jury trial to comport with procedural develop-
ments in a manner that is similar to the flexible definitions given "due process"
and "unreasonable searches and seizures." See McCoid, supra note 2, at 10-11.
The historical test has received sharp criticism in recent years. One writer
complains that the test retains too much deadwood from the past and is unsuited
to today's merger procedures, thus preventing continuous inquiry into the suit-
ability of various types of issues for jury trial. F. JAMES, supra note 1, § 8.3, at
347. Another commentator criticizes the test as "[injconsistent with the traditions
of principled constitutionalism that have guided the Supreme Court in the inter-
pretation of other commands of the Bill of Rights." Wolfram, The Constitutional
History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. Rav. 639, 731 (1973). See
also Comment, The Right to Jury Trial Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 37 U. Ci. L. Rav. 167, 172-74 (1969).
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Curtis and Pernell are notable for their exemplification of the type
of analysis to be used in determining if the right to jury trial attaches
to a cause of action embodied in a statute. When faced with seventh
amendment questions, some courts have tried to determine if the jury
right exists by asking whether the specific statutory claim is one that
historically could be brought at law.26 Both cases, however, stated
that the amendment's applicability goes beyond the common law
forms of action recognized in 1791.27 The relevant inquiry is whether
the statutory action involves rights and remedies of the sort recognized
at common law, even if the particular action was then unknown.28
Thus, courts are not to be straight-jacketed merely because the action
itself could not have been maintained at common law. Rather, they
are to search out the nearest historical analogue to the cause of action
the suit embraces and determine whether it would have involved the
right to jury trial in 1791.29
The Court also addressed the related problem of the distinction
between statutory rights and statutory proceedings. Mr. Justice
Holmes once innocently stated that the seventh amendment "does
not apply where the proceeding is not in the nature of a suit at
26. The court in Marr v. Rife, 363 F. Supp. 1362, 1364 (S.D. Ohio 1973),
reasoned that since slavery was legal in 1791, actions alleging racial discrimina-
tion could not have then been maintained. It denied the right to jury trial in
an action brought under the Fair Housing Act, for such an action was not
available at common law. In Pernell v. Southall Realty, 294 A.2d 490, 492-93
(D.C. App. 1972), reu'd, 416 U.S. 363 (1974), jury trial was denied because
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1501 (1973), provides for an expedited proceeding in
which title is not tried; it thus bears only superficial resemblance to common
law ejectment actions.
27. Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. at 375-76; Curtis v. Loether, 415
U.S. at 193.
28. The damage action in Curtis was analogized to common law tort actions,
such as that available against an innkeeper who refused lodging or an action for
defamation or intentional infliction of mental distress. 415 U.S. at 195-96. In
Pernell, although the proceeding established by the District of Columbia statute
was a "far cry in detail from the common-law action of ejeetment," both served
the same essential function, permitting eviction of one who is wrongfully detaining
possession. 416 U.S. at 375. The Court also found that every action recognized
in 1791 for recovery of the possession of property carried with it the right to
jury trial. Id. at 376.
29. This principle was recognized as early as Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.)
433, 447 (1830), and finds wide support among commentators. E.g., F. JAmsEs,
supra note 1, § 8.1, at 339; 5 J. MOORE, supra note 13, 1 38.11[7]; 9 C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2316, at 79 (1971). For a
case applying this analysis but holding against the right to jury trial see Luria
v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 27-28 (1913).
[Vol. 10:313
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common law."3 0 His remark has occasionally been interpreted as
distinguishing between substantive rights derived from common law
and those derived from statute. This interpretation has been used
to hold that no jury trial is required in a cause of action created by
statute, since any such action would have been unknown at common
law.:*" The court of appeals in Curtis expressly rejected this approach
and emphasized that the proper distinction is between a proceeding
"in the nature of a suit at common law" (i.e. a judicial action) and
a "statutory proceeding" (such as an administrative hearing). 2 The
Supreme Court approved this distinction.33 The question is where
legal rights and remedies created by statute are enforceable-if in an
action in ordinary courts of law, the jury right attaches; if in a
special administrative proceeding, unknown to the common law, then
strictures of the seventh amendment do not apply.34
30. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937).
31. "The law is well established that the various special statutory actions which
have been created from time to time ... do not come within the meaning of
common law." Lawton v. Nightingale, 345 F. Supp. 683, 684 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
This was also the unsuccessful contention of the federal government in United
States v. Friedland, 94 F. Supp. 721, 723 (D. Conn. 1950).
32. 467 F.2d at 1115.
33. 415 U.S. at 194-95. The idea that a cause for relief based upon a statute
is not per se free from the constitutional right to jury trial is not unique to
Curti . Mr. Justice Story, in Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 445-46(1830), expressly rejected the dissent's contention that the seventh amendment
was inapplicable because the claim arose not under common law but under the
statutes of Louisiana. In an unbroken line of cases involving enforcement of
statutory rights, the Court has treated the right to jury trial as well settled.
E.g., Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 479 (1962) (trademark in-
fringement); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510 (1959)(Sherman & Clayton Acts); Fleitmann v. Welsbach St. Lighting Co., 240 U.S.
27, 29 (1916) (Sherman Act); Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103, 115(1909) (Alien Immigration Act of 1903).
34. Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. at 383; Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S.
at 195.
One commentator has expressed concern at Mr. Justice Marshall's statement,
416 U.S. at 383, that "[w]e may assume that the Seventh Amendment would
not be a bar to a congressional effort to entrust landlord-tenant disputes, in-
cluding those over the right to possession, to an administrative agency." 4 L.
PROJECr BULL., Issue 5, at 5-6 (1974). Such an agency may rely for its con-
stitutionality on Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921), upholding a statute trans-
ferring actions for the recovery of real property from the courts to a rent control
commission. In Perneil Mr. Justice Marshall said that Block "merely stands for
the principle that the Seventh Amendment is generally inapplicable in administra-
tive proceedings, where jury trials would be incompatible with the whole concept
of administrative adjudication." 416 U.S. at 383. Block, however, involved an
exceptional situation-a severe housing shortage following World War I-and
1975]
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The practical effects of Curtis and Pernell are far-reaching, for now
parties in actions of these types will be able to submit their claims to
juries as of right.3 5 The consequences of this right will vary widely,
depending upon the type of suit involved. In actions brought under
the Fair Housing Act, the damages recovered may diminish because
jurors are not likely to be sympathetic to the plaintiffs' claims. 0
the regulation was to be in effect for only two years. 256 U.S. at 154. Such a
temporary authority is clearly distinguishable from a permanent landlord-tenant
agency, which Congress could not create by relying solely on its police power.
Several commentators have considered Congress' power to entrust determination
of actions traditionally heard at law to administrative agencies and have suggested
persuasive constitutional arguments that such agencies would not violate the
seventh amendment. See, e.g., Micon, Constitutional and Other Limitations on
Illinois Administrative Agencies, 24 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 137, 155 (1946); Note,
Application of Constitutional Guarantees of Jury Trial to the Administrative
Process, 56 HAuv. L. REv. 282, 293-94 (1942); Comment, The Seventh Amend-
ment and Civil Rights Statutes, supra note 9, at 527-30. See also Brown, Admin-
istrative Commissions and the Judicial Power, 19 MINN. L. REv. 261 (1935).
These constitutional arguments are important in light of specific proposals for
the creation of landlord-tenant agencies. E.g., McNamara, The District of Colum-
bia Landlord and Tenant Court: An Obsolete Structure in Need of Reform, 23
CATH. U.L. REv. 275 (1973).
35. The seventh amendment applies only to courts of the United States,
Minneapolis & St. L.R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916), including
those of the District of Columbia. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 5
(1899). Pernell, therefore, will not be directly applicable to the typical eviction
case, which is generally brought in state court. Analysis similar to that used in
Pernell may be applied in state court actions, however, when antecedent state
common law and state constitutional provisions are involved: "Where the state
common law granted a right to jury trial in eviction proceedings immediately
prior to the adoption of the state constitution and that constitution contains a
guarantee of the right to jury trial in civil proceedings, then the state court
may be compelled by its own state constitution to recognize the right to trial by
jury in eviction proceedings notwithstanding state statutes or rules of court to
the contrary." 4 L. PROJECT BULL., Issue 9, at 4 (1974). In addition, state
courts have often found federal construction of the seventh amendment either
persuasive or controlling in construing their own constitutional provisions for
civil jury trial. 1 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 492, 493 n.5 (1973). The state court
issue did not arise in Curtis. Mr. Justice Marshall stated that since the decision
was based on the seventh amendment rather than on construction of Title VIII,
the issue of jury trial in actions brought in state courts was not being decided.
415 U.S. at 192 n.6.
36. Note, Jones v. Mayer, supra note 19, at 1051. "If most white citizens had
substantial objections to discriminatory refusals to sell property, there would be
no need for the laws in the first place." Id. at 1051 n.229. See also Goldfarb
& Kurzman, Civil Rights v. Civil Liberties: The Jury Trial Issue, 12 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 486, 487 (1965); Comment, The Right to Jury Trial under Title VII, supra
note 25.
In cases brought under the Fair Housing Act, it is regularly the white defendant
who requests the jury trial and the black plaintiff who objects. E.g., Marr v.
[Vol. 10:313
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Legislative history reveals that the Act's proponents were concerned
about this possibility. 7 Curtis recognized that jury prejudice could
deprive a victim of discrimination of the verdict to which he is
entitled, but this risk was not sufficient to overcome dictates of the
seventh amendment.3s On the other hand, the jury right will prob-
ably have the opposite effect in eviction cases. A jury is likely to
include renters, who may be sympathetic to the evicted tenant and
unwilling to enforce landlord-weighted laws.39 Landlords may also
be more inclined to settle out of court, rather than face a jury pre-
sumably sympathetic to the tenant's interests.40 Although these argu-
ments run counter to the traditional concept of the jury as an
impartial fact-finder, common sense suggests that the allocation of
questions of fact between judge and jury may have a great influence
upon the result, especially in cases involving such volatile issues as
open housing.sl
The major significance of these two cases lies not in their specific
holdings but in the type of analysis employed. They evince a return
Rife, 363 F. Supp. 1362 (S.D. Ohio 1973); Kelly v. Armbrust, 351 F. Supp.
869 (D.N.D. 1972); Cauley v. Smith, 347 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Va. 1972);
Kastner v. Brackett, 326 F. Supp. 1151 (D. Nev. 1971).
37. For thorough analysis of the legislative history of Title VIII and other
civil rights statutes, revealing concern among supporters that jury trials might
conflict with the purposes of these statutes, see Brief for Petitioner at 15-26,
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
38. 415 U.S. at 198. The Court also felt that the trial judge's power to direct
a verdict, grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or grant a new trial
provides substantial protection against this risk. Id.
Other courts have discussed the problem of jury bias. Lawton v. Nightingale,
345 F. Supp. 683 (N.D. Ohio 1972), was an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970), which authorizes damage actions for violations of civil rights. That court
stated, "If a jury could be resorted to in actions brought under this statute, the
very evil the statute is designed to prevent would often be attained. The person
seeking to vindicate an unpopular right could never succeed before a jury drawn
from a populace mainly opposed to his views." Id. at 684. In Cook v. Cox,
357 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Va. 1973), also an action under § 1983, the court said
that "legislative history reveals that the Congress was motivated in part to pass
the act by what it viewed as a failure of southern juries to justly consider the
claims of Negro litigants in state courts." Id. at 125.
39. 1 FORDHANI URBAN L.J. 492, 493 n.3 (1973).
40. 60 GEO. L.J. 848, 855-56 (1972).
41. 1 FORDHAMNI URBAN L.J. 492, 493 n.3 (1973). For an argument that such
an approach is based on elitist and undemocratic presumptions see Comment,
The Seventh Amendment and Civil Rights Statutes, supra note 9, at 538.
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to fundamentals in construing the seventh amendment and indicate
that functional analysis was an exception to the rule, rather than a
new trend. Curtis and Pernell should give new impetus to the his-
torical test and serve as prototypes for courts faced with seventh
amendment questions.
Lois L. Griffith
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